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And we need to verify all CRL and OCSP paths which are found in all the certificates in the certifice hierarchy starting with the leaf certificate and proceeding through all upper CA certificates. In any other sub-certificate, the two Subject and Issuer fields contain different values. Note: how do you distinguish between a root CA certificate and any sub-certificate? Root CA certificate contains the same value in its Subject and Issuer fields and thus is also called self-signed certificate. Common mistake is to start with some CA certificate, in the worst case, with the root CA. The leaf certificate is always what we will start with when checking revocation. The leaf certificate (also endpoint or end-entity certificate) is the certificate which web servers use, which are loaded into smart cards for user logon, they are those that you use to sing an email or document etc.

Usual certificate hierarchy includes some root CA, may be several intermediate CAs, always one issuing CA (which may be identical to the root CA in case of a single CA path) and finally the end-point leaf certificate. How leaf certificates contain CRL and OCSP paths Thus we still need smooth online validation, no talking about it. If the response expires or in case of some services (such as EAP/PEAP client or IPHTTPS), validation is always done online. Note the term 'valid response' and 'most services'.

If a valid response is found in local cache, most services will not go to network again. Note that both CRL and OCSP responses may be (and are usually) cached on computers that perform the validation. What we want is smooth online CRL and/or OCSP availability. If not available, it may result in unpleasant timeouts and delays in session establishement. In these cases, we have CRL validation on both sides - on the client against validity of the server certificate, and on the server side against validity of the client certificate.ДЄnyway, all applications at least try to check CRL. If you use client certificates for authentication to some TLS/SSL/EAP/PEAP or Kerberos services, the server part of the channel verifies CRL of client certificate as well. Other require CRL validation to allow the certificate use at all, although you can usually disable certificate revocation in registry.Д¬RL is verified for digitally signed executable files and scripts, digitally signed documents or signed and encrypted mail certificates, as well as for client EFS encryption and recovery certificates as well as for BitLocker recovery certificates. In case of IPSec client, the default is also to verify, but allow IKE establishment even if no CRL is available. Although current Internet Explorer does not block access to HTTPS web pages for which it cannot verify revocation, it at least displays warning dialog box and yellow address bar. Clients of quite any TLS/ SSL based, IPSec based or EAP and PEAP server verify server certificate's revocation by default. Most services require successful CRL validation to trust and use the certificate in question.

Phylosophically, I can thus call the revocation information simply ' CRL', although I will talk about OCSP as well. The important point here is, that because CAs themselves publish only CRLs, the OCSP web service verifies the revocation information from CRLs as well.

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CAs can publish this HTTP web service and allow for online validation where client just sends certificate serial number and receives its status. To better optimize network traffic, there is a newer standard called OCSP (online certificate status protocol).

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You can see the slight nonsense - to verify validity of a single certificate you might download several hundreds kBs. Because the CRL contains all revoked certificates (actually only their serial numbers, each entry taking about 90 bytes), it can be large, sometimes in order of kBs or even MBs. Clients can download the CRL and verify whether a certificate is listed or not. Certificate revocation list is the actual thing a CA produces. Notete: I will mainly refer to the revocation information by shorter term CRL. The revocation function was unable to check revocation because the revocation server was offline.